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Introduction
After years of speculation,1 the United States Supreme Court has
finally decided the legal effect of a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal
reference to counsel during interrogation.2 In a five to four decision,
3
the Court held in Davis v. United States that an ambiguously worded
request is insufficient to invoke counsel.4 The Court further held the
police have no duty to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel during
interrogation to determine whether the suspect is invoking the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel.'
Although striving to create a bright-line rule, their holding may
well create more confusion than clarity. The Court provides little gui-
dance in determining which statements are considered ambiguous.6
The police are still left with "difficult judgment calls," with suspects'
Fifth Amendment rights hanging in the balance.7 Moreover, the Da-
vis decision disregards the underlying rationales, set forth in Miranda
v. Arizona,8 for interposing an attorney between a criminal suspect
and law enforcement officials during custodial interrogation.9 Davis
places the greatest burden upon a variety of suspects who are least
able to shoulder it: the poor; the uneducated; women; and ethnic mi-
norities whose cultural, educational, or lingual attributes are more
1. See, eg., James J. Tomkovicz, Standard for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in
Confession Contexts, 71 IowA L. Rtv. 975 (1986); Charles Shreffier, Jr., Note, Judicial
Approaches to the Ambiguous Request for Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 460 (1987); Ada Clapp, Comment, The Second Circuit Review-1988-1989
Term: Criminal Procedure: The Second Circuit Adopts a Clarification Approach to Ambigu-
ous Requests for Counser United States v. Gotay, 56 BROOK. L. RPv. 511 (1990).
2. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2352 (1994).
3. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia
constituted a majority; Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion. Justices Souter,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment.
4. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
5. Id. at 2356.
6. Id. at 2355.
7. Id at 2356.
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring).
likely to lead to the use of equivocal language when invoking
counsel.10
Prior to Davis, lower courts had developed three different ap-
proaches to determining the consequences of an ambiguous reference
to counsel: the per se invocation standard, the clarification standard,
and the threshold-of-clarity standard.11 Under the "per se invocation"
standard, any reference to counsel made by the suspect after Miranda
warnings would be considered a per se invocation of counsel, requir-
ing the complete cessation of police-initiated interrogation.' 2 Under
the "clarification" standard, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions,' 3
the police are allowed to continue the exchange but are limited to
questions aimed at clarifying whether the suspect is invoking the right
to counsel through an ambiguous statement.' 4 Under the "threshold-
of-clarity" standard, a suspect's statement is required to meet a certain
threshold of clarity before becoming effective, allowing the police to
continue their questioning unhindered.' 5
This Comment criticizes the Court's decision to adopt the most
uncompromising of these approaches. In doing so, the Court failed to
heed the dictates of its own precedent 6 as well as what a majority of
American courts' 7 and a significant body of law enforcement agen-
cies'8 have come to regard as the most fair and equitable procedure in
the context of police interrogation-the clarification standard. The
Court has effectively converted the right to counsel during interroga-
10. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993).
11. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984); Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353-54.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1985); Maglio v. Jago, 580
F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978).
13. For a sample list of jurisdictions, see Ainsworth, supra note 10, at 308 n.254.
14. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
15. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 96 n.3.
16. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); and Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990)).
17. See Ainsworth, supra note 10, at 308 n.254.
18. Brief Amici Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., Joined by
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., the National District Attorneys As-
sociation, Inc., and the National Sheriffs' Association, in Support of the Respondent, Davis
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949), quoted in Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359
n.2 (Souter, J., concurring).
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tion into an empty promise: it has become remarkably easy to waive 19
and, after Davis, extremely difficult to reinvoke.20
This Comment further argues that although a majority of courts
consider the clarification approach the most feasible standard to ap-
ply,21 it leads to a whole new set of complications, such as the use of
clarifying questions to badger suspects into rescinding their request
for counsel.22 Alternatives involving the use of the clarification stan-
dard, supplemented by a systemic crackdown on police officers known
to be abusing the clarification process, have been suggested.23 How-
ever, the per se invocation standard remains the only approach which
realistically ensures that even timid and unassertive suspects can ac-
cess their constitutional right to the assistance of counsel during custo-
dial interrogation.
Section I of this Comment provides a brief review of the history
and evolution of the case law in this area, beginning with Miranda,
and analyzes the original rationale behind providing suspects with a
Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Section II summarizes the particu-
lars of the Davis decision, detailing the plurality and concurring opin-
ions. Section III provides a critique of Davis, and Section IV analyzes
its impact on federal and state decisions involving the Fifth Amend-
ment rights of suspects during interrogation. Section V proposes that
state courts treat Davis as a foundation and provide greater protection
to suspects during the interrogation process by requiring, at the very
least, clarification of an ambiguous statement.24 Finally, this Com-
19. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding no express waiver of Mi-
randa rights is necessary and an implied waiver can be inferred from the words and actions
of the suspect).
20. David Jonas, counsel for Respondent, made this point during arguments before
the Court. Arguments Before the Court, 62 U.S.L.W. 3681, 3681-82 (1994); see infra notes
149-150 and accompanying text.
21. For a cogent statement of this position, see Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 1009-13;
see also Shreffier, supra note 1, at 470-72.
22. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
23. Professor Yale Kamisar suggested this approach during the U.S. Law Week Consti-
tutional Law Conference reviewing the Supreme Court's 1993-94 term. Constitutional Law
Scholars Assess Impact of Supreme Court's 1993-94 Term, 63 U.S.L.W. 2229, 2234 (1994)
[hereinafter U.S. Law Week Constitutional Law Conference]; see infra note 236 and accom-
panying text; see also YALE KANsAR, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in POLICE IN'IRROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONs 27, 31-32
(1980).
24. See e.g., State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504 (Haw. 1994) (providing Hawaiian citizens
with broader protections under the state constitution than that recognized by the Davis
majority under the federal constitution, and adopting the clarification approach); infra
note 227.
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ment advocates the per se invocation standard as the only approach
that truly protects the Fifth Amendment rights of suspects in custody.
I. Legal Background
A. Miranda v. Arizona and Suspects' Fifth Amendment Rights
For the past thirty years, the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Miranda v. Arizona2' has provided the doctrinal framework for
the application of the Fifth Amendment26 right against compulsory
self-incrimination during custodial2 7 interrogations. The Miranda
Court recognized the need for procedural safeguards to protect this
right in the face of the pressures inherent in the interrogation pro-
cess.' A clear history of abuse by law enforcement officials led the
Court to declare:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process
of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of
crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.29
The procedural safeguards consist of a set of warnings that in-
clude the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel, retained
or appointed, present at the interrogation. ° These warnings are so
well known today through exposure on television3' that even the
25. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as police-initiated question-
ing "after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Generally, a suspect is consid-
ered to be in custody if she reasonably perceives that she is not free to leave; recently in a
per curiam decision, the Court re-emphasized the determination of custody depends on
how a "reasonable person" in the suspect's shoes would have perceived the situation.
Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994).
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
29. Id at 467.
30. The Court clearly set forth these warnings in a summary of its holding:
[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id at 479.
31. With the rise in popularity of television programs depicting actual police work,
such as Cops and Real Stories of the Highway Patrol, viewers now get a first-hand look at
this aspect of criminal procedure.
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youngest members of society can recite them verbatim.32 By requiring
the police to inform suspects of their constitutional rights, the Court
hoped to combat the inherently coercive and compelling atmosphere
of a custodial interrogation.
33
Miranda suggested there could be no questioning if the suspect
indicates "in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attomey." Read for its face value, the
words "in any manner" and "at any stage" suggest that any reference
to counsel, regardless of equivocality or ambiguity, should immedi-
ately terminate the interrogation.35 The Court considered the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation "indispensable to the protec-
tion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
'3 6
B. Post-Miranda Case Law: Carving Away at the Protections
The Court began narrowing Miranda as early as 1971, when it
held that statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to
impeach a defendant's testimony.37 Eight years later, the Court held a
juvenile suspect's request to see his probation officer during interroga-
tion was not the equivalent of a request for a lawyer, despite clear
indications that the juvenile doubted the police would honestly pro-
cure an attorney for him.38 In that same year, the Court held an ex-
32. Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 364 n.27 (1995)
(author noting that even her seven and nine-year-old sons can recite the warnings almost
verbatim).
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
34. Id. at 444-45.
35. This interpretation is even supported by language in Justice Clark's dissent in Mi-
randa, wherein he states: "When at any point during an interrogation the accused seeks
affirmatively or impliedly to invoke his rights to silence or counsel, interrogation must be
foregone or postponed." Id at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 469. The Court later clarified in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
that while the right to counsel is not found on the face of the Fifth Amendment, the right
created in Miranda stems directly from the Fifth Amendment. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 481-
82.
37. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). This case has been criticized as severely
undercutting the purposes of Miranda: Evidence submitted before a jury ostensibly to im-
peach a defendant often seems to prove the guilt of the defendant, especially since juries
are notoriously incapable of distinguishing between the substantive and impeachment val-
ues of such testimony. For an example of the detrimental impact of this decision on sus-
pects' rights during interrogations, see Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.) (en
banc) (uncovering detailed police plan whereby suspects' requests for counsel were sys-
tematically ignored to induce hopelessness and extract a confession which could later be
used to impeach the suspects at trial and keep them off the witness stand), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 407 (1992).
38. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). The juvenile's reason for not demanding a
lawyer was probably a lack of. trust, rather than a lack of interest. When told of his right to
press waiver of Miranda rights was unnecessary, finding an implied
waiver could be inferred from the actions and words of the person
being interrogated.39
In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court created a bright-line rule: once
a suspect has invoked counsel, the police must cease all questioning
until counsel has been provided or the suspect initiates a new ex-
change, whereupon police may resume questioning.40 The same rule,
however, narrowed the standard for determining whether an invoca-
tion had actually occurred. The Edwards Court stated, "it is inconsis-
tent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities . . . to
reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right
to counsel."'41 This language itself conflicted with the "in any man-
ner"42 language in Miranda and established, through the plain mean-
ing of the words "clearly asserted," a much higher standard for the
invocation of the right to counsel than set forth by Miranda.
Soon after, the Court went even further and began carving out
major exceptions to the Edwards rule. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, the
suspect clearly invoked his right to counsel,43 but the Court neverthe-
less found the defendant had later "initiated" a conversation with po-
lice by asking, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?," thereby
removing the Edwards protection and allowing police to continue in-
terrogation despite the clear invocation of counsel.'
The Miranda warnings themselves began to take on less. signifi-
cance. The Court created the "public safety exception," whereby po-
lice need not read the Miranda warnings prior to questioning
prompted by concern for public safety.45 In 1985, the Court found
that the failure to give Miranda warnings prior to a first interrogation
did not destroy the admissibility of information obtained during a
prewarned second interrogation.46 The Court ignored the psychologi-
cally corrosive effect an unwarned first confession would have on a
suspect's decision whether to remain silent during the second interro-
gation, and rejected the "cat-out-of-the-bag" theory put forth by the
counsel, Michael C. replied, "How [do] I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and
tell me he's an attorney?" Id. at 710.
39. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
40. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
41. Id at 485 (emphasis added).
42. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
43. 462 U.S. 1039, 1041-42 (1983).
44. Id at 1045.
45. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (holding evidence obtained through this
questioning was admissible despite the absence of warnings).
46. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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dissent.47 Justice Brennan, in dissent, called the decision a "poten-
tially crippling blow to Miranda and the ability of courts to safeguard
the rights of persons accused of crime.148 Several years later in Duck-
worth v. Eagan, the Court found police had complied with Miranda
despite the fact that the warnings given to the suspect were ambiguous
and inexact, and in the view of the dissent, outright misleading to
"frightened suspects unlettered in law."
49
The role of counsel during the interrogation came into serious
question following the Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine.50 In a
six to three decision," the Court found the suspect's waiver remained
effective, despite the police declining to tell him that a lawyer had
been retained for him and even preventing the lawyer, through trick-
ery, from seeing the suspect.
52
Thereafter, decisions of the Court favorable to the suspect ap-
plied only after there had been a "clear" invocation of counsel and
Edwards had been triggered. In Arizona v. Roberson, the Court held
the Edwards ban against further interrogation applied even when po-
lice wished to question the suspect about a different crime, making the
Fifth Amendment invocation nonoffense specific. 5 3 And in Justice
Blackmun's last opinion, the Court held once a suspect had invoked
and consulted with counsel, the Edwards rule was deemed violated
unless the lawyer was present during the subsequent questioning.54
From this case law, it is apparent that the Court intended to pro-
vide strong Miranda protections only after the suspect had made a
clear invocation of counsel. Prior to that invocation, only limited pro-
tection would be available. Following a clear invocation, the police
were to immediately cease questioning under Edwards; and according
to Roberson, there was to be no questioning about the original crime
or any other crime.55 The police were also to provide the suspect with
47. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Ld. at 319.
49. 492 U.S. 195,216 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The warnings included the sen-
tence: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you
wish, if and when you go to court." Id. at 198.
50. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
51. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor constituted the majority. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
52. Moran, 475 U.S. at 412 (suspect's lawyer called the station and the police told her
that her client would not be questioned or put in a line-up that night; shortly after this
conversation with the lawyer, police procured a written waiver of the suspect's Miranda
rights and subsequently, a confession).
53. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
54. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
55. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
counsel and allow that counsel to be present during subsequent
interrogations. 6
Two questions remained for the Court: first, what exactly consti-
tutes a "clear" or "ambiguous" invocation of counsel; and second,
what legal effect to accord "ambiguous" invocations of counsel. These
were the issues taken up by the Court in Davis.
II. Davis v. United States
A. Factual Background
Robert L. Davis, a member of the United States Navy, spent the
evening of October 2, 1988 playing pool with fellow Seabaan Appren-
tice Keith Shackleford at a club on the Charleston Naval Base in
North Carolina.17 Shackleford made a thirty dollar wager with Davis
over a game of pool, but lost the game and refused to pay.58 Later
that night, Shackleford was beaten to death with a pool cue on a load-
ing dock 9 His body was discovered early the next morning6
In the course of investigation, the Naval Investigative Service
(NIS) agents found that only privately-owned pool cues could be re-
moved from the club.61 The NIS agents further discovered that Davis
was at the club that evening, absent from his duty station without au-
thorization the following morning, and owned two cues-one of which
had a bloodstain on it.6' Davis had also been overheard saying that
Shackleford had been "hit and jabbed with a pool stick" when this
information regarding the manner of death was not common
knowledge.63
On November 4, 1988, Davis was interviewed at an NIS office.64
He was advised of his Article 31(b) rights and his right to counsel.6
56. Minnick, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
57. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2352 (1994).
58. Id. at 2352-53.
59. Id. at 2353. Shackleford died of head injuries inflicted with a blunt object, later
determined to be a pool cue. United States v. Davis, 36 MJ. 337, 338 (C.M.A. 1990).
60. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339.
64. Id Petitioner's brief indicates that Davis was handcuffed to his chair throughout
the duration of the interview and that the NIS agents had access to videotape and audi-
otape equipment but deliberately chose not to utilize this equipment. Brief of Petitioner at
10, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949).
65. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339. The military equivalent of the Miranda warning about the
right to silence reads:
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Davis executed a written waiver of his rights,66 orally waived his
rights, and agreed to answer some questions "because he didn't kill
anyone.
67
About an hour and a half into the interview, Davis said, "Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer. ' 68 The agents then ceased questioning Davis
about the murder. One of the agents who testified at trial stated:
[At that point we] made it very clear that we're not here to vio-
late his rights, that if he wants a lawyer, then we will stop any
kind of questioning with him, that we weren't going'to pursue
the matter unless we have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or
is he just making a comment about a lawyer, and he said, 'No,
I'm not asking for a lawyer,' and then he continued on, and said,
'No, I don't want a lawyer.'
69
Following a short break, the agents briefly reminded Davis of his
rights and resumed questioning.70 About an hour later, Davis said, "I
think I want a lawyer before I say anything else."'7 1 The agents then
ceased the interrogation. 72
B. Lower Court Decisions
At his general court-martial, Davis moved to suppress statements
he had made during the November 4 interview. 73 The military judge
denied his motion, holding that Davis's mention of a lawyer was "not
in the form of a request for counsel."'74 Davis was convicted of unpre-
meditated murder, largely based on the results of the interrogation.75
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement
from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him
of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make
any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that
any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by
court-martial.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1995).
66. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339.
67. Id.
68. Id at 339-40.
69. Id at 340.
70. Id
71. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2353 (1994).
72. Id
73. Id
74. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341.
75. While Davis orally denied killing Shackleford at this interrogation, he did retract
an earlier alibi involving his girlfriend and admitted he was at the club "with three other
friends." Id. at 340. Davis's approved sentence provided for a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for life, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and a reduction in rank to the
lowest pay grade. Id. at 338; Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
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In 1991, the Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and
sentence.76 The United States Court of Military Appeals also af-
firmed 77 after finding that the agents had correctly clarified Davis's
statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," and he iad iot, in fact,
invoked his right to counsel at that point in the interrogation.78 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed the
judgment in a five to four decision.
79
C. The United States Supreme Court Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Decision
Five members of the Court,80 in an opinion authored by Justice
O'Connor, affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Military Ap-
peals.8 ' In the plurality opinion,8 2 the Court went even further than
the lower court and held that police are under no obligation to either
terminate the interrogation or to clarify the suspect's statement unless
a suspect unambiguously and unequivocally requests an attorney.8 3
The plurality began its analysis with a review of the three differ-
ent approaches used by lower courts in considering a suspect's ambig-
uous or equivocal request for counsel.84 It then provided a brief
overview of post-Miranda case law, highlighting the safeguards estab-
lished since Miranda to ensure that a suspect, having invoked counsel,
was protected from further interrogation. 8 The Court emphasized,
however, that the "'rigid' prophylactic rule"86 of Edwards applied
only when a suspect had "clearly asserted '8 7 the right to counsel, and
ambiguous invocations did not trigger the protection of the Edwards
rule.88 A suspect was required to request counsel "sufficiently clearly
that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand
76. See Davis, 36 M.J. at 338.
77. Id. at 341.
78. Id at 342.
79. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (the Court unanimously affirmed the lower court's ruling,
but four of the concurring justices did not endorse the threshold-of-clarity standard).
80. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the
opinion. Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion.
81. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357.
82. Although Justice Scalia constituted the fifth justice to join in this decision, the
rationale in his concurring opinion differs significantly from that of Justice O'Connor's
opinion.
83. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
84. Id. at 2353; see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
85. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354-55.
86. Id at 2355 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979)).
87. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
88. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
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the statement to be a request for an attorney."8 9 HeInce, the plurality
declined the "invitation to extend Edwards."90
The plurality noted the disadvantaged position of suspects who,
because of "fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of
other reasons," would fail to utilize clear language in requesting an
attorney.91 Notwithstanding this, they felt the "primary protection"
offered these suspects was the Miranda warnings themselves, conclud-
ing that a knowing and voluntary waiver92 of these rights was an indi-
cation of a suspect's willingness to remain unassisted during
interrogation.93 The justices rationalized their decision with the need
for effective law enforcement, or as Justice O'Connor described it,
"the other side of the Miranda equation."'94 They feared the easy ap-
plication of the Edwards rule would be lost if police were required to
cease questioning upon an ambiguous invocation of counsel.95 Fur-
ther, the plurality declined to adopt the clarification standard, stating
that while it would be good practice for police to clarify an ambiguous
statement, they were under no obligation to do so.
96
2. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
97
Justice Scalia focused his opinion upon a wholly separate issue,
namely, section 3501 of title 18 of the United States Code, a statute
governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions.9"
Congress added this provision as part of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in response to intense opposition to the
Miranda ruling.99 Although the statute is rarely raised by the U.S.
Department of Justice in cases involving confessions, 100 and successive
89. Id.
90. Id
91. IdL at 2356.
92. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding waiver is an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege").




97. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring). The issues raised by Justice
Scalia's concurrence, while interesting, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
98. Id. at 2357.
99. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. II, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)
(1995).
100. The U.S. Department of Justice is perhaps motivated by the likely unconstitution-
ality of the provision if applied to confessions. LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: Crime, Law and
Politics 207 (1983).
administrations have been steadfast in their refusal to enforce it,
1°1
Justice Scalia argued that the time has come for the statute to receive
the attention it is due.
10 2
Section 3501(b) sets forth a "totality of the circumstances" test
which allows a trial judge to look at "all the circumstances surround-
ing the giving of the confession" to determine whether it was volunta-
rily given.' 03 Under this statute, the failure to advise the suspect of
the right to silence and right to counsel may not be fatal to the admis-
sibility of the confession if the trial judge finds the remaining circum-
stances indicate the confession was voluntarily given.104
By eliminating the rebuttable presumption created in Miranda,05
the provision is effectively a legislative overruling of the landmark de-
cision. Justice Scalia noted that for most of this century, a case-by-
case determination of voluntariness was the key to admissibility of
confessions. 0 6 Section 3501 would reinstate this case-by-case deter-
mination of voluntariness, substituting the judgment of Congress for
that of the Court.
The congressional provision gives rise to many uncertainties-
whether Congress should be able to legislatively overrule Court deci-
sions,0 7 the desired breadth of prosecutorial discretion, and even the
meaning or constitutionality of section 3501. Notwithstanding these
debates, Justice Scalia argued since the statute is on the books, as fed-
eral judges, "[w]e shirk our duty if we systematically disregard that
statutory command simply because the Justice Department declines to
remind us of it."' 0 8 He served notice that he would apply the statute
to the next case before the Court which comes within the terms of
section 3501.109
101. The Johnson Administration was the first of successive administrations to instruct
federal law enforcement agencies (the only entities to which title II is applicable) to ignore
the statute. Id. It was felt that if the Court held section 3501 unconstitutional, the net
effect would be to have more, not fewer, criminals on the streets. L
102. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1995).
104. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (arguing custodial interrogations
conducted without the proper safeguards contain inherently compelling pressures that
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely).
106. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. Professor Yale Kamisar discussed the topic of legislative "overruling" of constitu-
tional precedents at the U.S. Law Week Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 23, at
2235-36.
108. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. 1&.
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3. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion
1 °
In his concurring opinion, joined by three other justices,"' Justice
Souter agreed with the majority that the agents did not overstep their
bounds in asking clarifying questions about Davis's statement and
therefore concurred in affirming Davis's conviction.112 The opinion
rejected, however, the conclusion that the agents had no legal obliga-
tion to discern what Davis meant through his ambiguous reference to
counsel.11
3
Justice Souter pointed to the Court's own precedent, a majority
of lower courts, and a large body of law enforcement officials, all of
whom argue to the contrary.1 4 In the interests of fairness and practi-
cality, law enforcement officials should cease interrogation and at-
tempt to determine what a suspect means by an ambiguous reference
to counsel." 5
To establish the groundwork, Justice Souter set forth two widely
accepted principles inherent in the relationship between police and
suspects in a custodial interrogation: (1) Miranda exists to ensure the
suspect receives a fair opportunity to choose whether to remain silent
throughout the interrogation process; and (2) Miranda must remain
consistent with practical realities of the real world." 6 According to
Justice Souter, the clarification approach fulfills both of these goals."
7
It assures that the suspect's wishes will be honored by the police, deals
with real-world misunderstandings that occur during the interrogation
process, and acknowledges the limited ability of both the police and
courts to apply "fine distinctions and intricate rules.""
8
The opinion then proceeded to test the plurality's approach
against these same two principles and concluded it "does not fare so
well."" 9 Justice Souter noted that fear, intimidation, linguistic inabili-
ties, and ignorance are all prevalent characteristics of criminal sus-
pects in custody.'2 Given these factors, the Court had in the past
110. Id. at 2358.
111. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined this opinion.








120. Id. at 2360-61.
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been disinclined to require precision or clarity, but rather gave the
suspect the benefit of the doubt when requesting counsel.' 2'
Justice Souter also refuted the distinction between invocations
made before and after an initial waiver of Miranda rights." He
pointed out that the goal of Miranda itself was to provide suspects
with a "continuous opportunity" to exercise their rights "in any man-
ner and at any stage."2 3 Such language clearly contradicts the notion
that Miranda rights should be more difficult to reinvoke once initially
waived and the suspect should bear the burden of showing an une-
quivocal reinvocation was made.124
Quoting language from Miranda,25 Justice Souter further argued
that Miranda warnings cannot, in and of themselves, be relied upon to
counteract the inherently coercive atmosphere of a custodial interro-
gation. 26 He pointed out that the plurality's approach creates a situa-
tion in which suspects will feel increasingly desperate as their wishes,
albeit ambiguously expressed, are ignored by the interrogators." 7
The Miranda warnings are empty words to suspects who "may well see
further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way
to end his interrogation."" 2-8
Justice Souter contested the plurality's assertion that the thresh-
old-of-clarity approach furthers the strong societal interest in effective
law enforcement.- 9 Although lost confessions do exact a price from
society, Justice Souter stated, "it is [a price] that Miranda itself deter-
mined should be borne.' 30 He also questioned the "ease of applica-
tion" claimed by the plurality's approach, asserting that the threshold-
of-clarity standard leaves "'difficult judgment calls' to law enforce-
ment officials instead of the suspect-arguably the most competent
party to resolve the ambiguity.'
3 '
121. Id. at 2361 (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986); Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1051 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498
U.S. 146, 160 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)).
124. Ld.
125. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 ("A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will
conduct the interrogation cannot itself suffice ... [to] assure that the ... right to choose
between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.").
126. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2361-62 (Souter, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2362.
129. Id. at 2363.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356).
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Despite Miranda's support for the per se invocation approach,
requiring an end to interrogation upon even an ambiguous request for
counsel, Justice Souter stopped short of endorsing that position.132 He
acknowledged that clarifying questions can be used to badger a sus-
pect into rescinding an earlier invocation. 133 However, he found the
per se invocation approach inconsistent with Miranda case law in that
"the strong bias in favor of individual choice may also be disserved by
stopping questioning when a suspect wants it to continue (but where
his statement might be understood otherwise)."'134 In other words, the
danger of the per se invocation approach is that even suspects who
wish to cooperate with the police and offer a confession might inad-
vertently terminate the interrogation with an ambiguous request for
counsel. The societal costs in this scenario would be even more diffi-
cult to bear, according to Justice Souter. 35
Justice Souter concluded his opinion with the hope that "trial
courts will apply today's ruling sensibly (without requiring criminal
suspects to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don)"' 36 and
interrogators will follow the "good police practice" of clarifying am-
biguous requests for counsel. 37
HI. A Critique of Davis: Police Efficiency in Exchange for
Suspects' Rights
A. Miranda Rights after Davis
From the outset, the plurality opinion makes it plain that Mi-
randa rights are not constitutionally decreed, but rather are judicially
created procedural safeguards. 38 The tenor of this proposition makes
it clear that the plurality does not regard the Miranda protections as
sacred and is, in fact, averse to the idea of providing protections over
and above what has already been granted.
In view of the prior case law, the Court's plurality decision is not
entirely surprising. 39 In cases following Miranda, the Court provided
132. Id.
133. Id
134. 1I at 2364.
135. Id.
136. Id
137. Id (quoting Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356).
138. Id. at 2354.
139. Many court watchers predicted this outcome. See, eg., Clapp, supra note 1, at 519.
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affirmative protection only to suspects who had crossed the Edwards
threshold by clearly asserting their right to counsel.'40
In the very first sentence of the opinion, the Davis plurality disre-
gards the "in any manner and at any stage"'' language of Miranda,
instead substituting the "clearly assert[s]" 4 2 language of Edwards as
the basis for determining whether a suspect has indeed invoked the
right to counsel.'43 This sets the tone for the rest of the opinion,
which effectively ignores the original language and rationale of
Miranda.44
In fact, it is Edwards, rather than Miranda, that serves as the be-
ginning, middle, and end of the plurality's analysis. The plurality
frames the issue within the Edwards context,14 thereby implying that
an invocation insufficiently clear to trigger the Edwards protection
should trigger no protection at all. The plurality makes the exacting
standard in Edwards the yardstick by which all suspect requests are to
be measured.
The opinion provides a detailed explanation of the plurality's re-
fusal to "extend Edwards" by requiring police officers to cease inter-
rogation immediately upon an ambiguous reference to counsel.'
46
While this explanation does address the plurality's rejection of the per
se invocation approach, it fails to explain why the plurality chooses
the other extreme of the spectrum, the threshold-of-clarity approach.
In fact, the plurality never explains its rejection of the clarification
approach-the approach most widely accepted by courts and law en-
forcement officials.147
Relying on Edwards, the Court's primary concern was the clarity
with which a suspect invoked his or her right, expecting a suspect
under interrogation to "clearly assert" a request for counsel.148 Not
only does this place an unacceptably high emphasis upon subtle lin-
140. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. The Court reaffirmed this in Smith
v. Illinois, stating, "Where nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances lead-
ing up to the request would render it ambiguous, all questioning must cease." 469 U.S. 91,
98 (1984).
141. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
142. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
143. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2352.
144. Id. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring); see also supra notes 41-42 and accompany-
ing text.
145. According to Justice O'Connor, the question presented was "how law enforcement
officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is insufficiently
clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning." Id. at 2352.
146. It. at 2355.
147. See supra note 18.
148. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
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guistic differences, it also creates a greater burden for suspects in cir-
cumstances in which they are least able or likely to satisfy it.
Furthermore, the effect is to make Miranda rights easier to waive
than to assert. A waiver may be inferred from the aggregate of a sus-
pect's words and actions,149 while an invocation must be clearly and
unequivocally asserted. In other words, a waiver need not be ex-
pressly stated, but an invocation requires a direct and explicit state-
ment. During arguments before the Court, counsel for Respondent,
David Jonas, compared this to a swinging door leading to the right to
counsel: a suspect would have to push hard on the door to gain entry
and obtain counsel, whereas to waive the right, all he would have to
do was touch it lightly and it flew open.150 This outcome is incompati-
ble with the underpinnings of Miranda and, most importantly, the
spirit of the Fifth Amendment.
B. Davis Ignores Cultural and Sociolinguistic Differences
The decision in Davis will have the greatest negative impact upon
those suspects who are most in need of Miranda protections. The plu-
rality and the concurring opinions both acknowledge that certain
groups, including women and ethnic minorities, will feel the brunt of
the decision to adopt the threshold-of-clarity approach.' 5 1 Due to cul-
tural and sociolinguistic differences, these groups of suspects utilize
ambiguous or equivocal language more often than other suspects,
even in contexts in which they are trying to express a firm desire or
imperative. Groups with a pronounced use of indirect or hedged
speech patterns include, inter alia, women,' 52 African-Americans,
53
and suspects who speak Arabic, Farsi, 54 Yiddish, Japanese, Indone-
sian, and Greek.15 5 With regard to foreign cultures in the United
149. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
150. Arguments Before the Court, supra note 20, at 3681-82.
151. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356; id at 2361 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).
152. See Ainsworth, supra note 10 at 271 (citing ROBIN LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WO-
MAN'S PLACE (1975) and Janet Holmes, 'Women's Language': A Functional Approach, 24
GEN. LiNGuisTics 149 (1984)).
153. See Ainsworth, supra note 10 at 318 (citing Thurmon Garner, Cooperative Com-
munication Strategies: Observations in a Black Community, 14 J. BLACK STUD. 233, 234-48
(1983) and GENEVA SMImHERMAN, TALny AND TEsTrm: THE LANGUAGE OF BLACK
AMERICA (1977)).
154. As a first generation Iranian-American, I find the predominant use of Farsi in our
home and my general cultural upbringing have infused my English with heightened polite-
ness and deference, which could conceivably be misunderstood as ambiguity.
155. See generally JoHN J. GUMPERZ & JENNY COoK-GUMPERZ, LANGUAGE AND SO.
CiAL IDENnTY (John J. Gumperz ed., 1982).
States, this pattern of speech is often passed on to second, third, and
even fourth generation members.156
Professor Janet Ainsworth has argued that due to an overall
sense of powerlessness, certain segments of the population tend to use
indirect and equivocal speech patterns.157 The five main characteris-
tics of this speech pattern are: hedges, tag questions, modal verbs,
avoidance of imperatives, and rising intonations.15 8
Hedges are expressions such as "kind of," "sort of," "I think," "I
guess," "maybe," or "perhaps," which soften or undercut an asser-
tion.159 Ainsworth's example of the use of tag questions is, "I should
see a lawyer, shouldn't I?" rather than "I should see a lawyer."' 60
Modal verbs consist of verbs such as "may," "might," "could,"
"ought," "should," or "must," which are similar to hedges in undercut-
ting the assertiveness of a statement.' 6' An absence of imperatives is
illustrated by the contrast between "If you don't mind, would you call
my lawyer?" and "Call my lawyer."' 62 The final characteristic com-
mon to these groups is the use of a rising intonation when making a
declarative statement, even though rising intonations are ordinarily
used to indicate a question; compare the meaning of "I need a lawyer"
and "I need a lawyer?"' 63 While Ainsworth acknowledges that not all
members of these groups share these characteristics, there is enough
sociolinguistic research to demonstrate that powerless sectors of soci-
ety do speak in registers other than the "standard" white male middle-
class pattern.' 64
Further aggravating matters, these suspects' sense of powerless-
ness is heightened by the fear and intimidation inherent in custodial
interrogations. 65 Tactics such as isolation of suspects, relentless and
repetitive questioning, "good cop/bad cop" routines, and the creation
of an atmosphere of domination are encouraged in police training
156. DEBORAH TANNEN, Ethnic Style in Male-Female Conversation, in GumPERz &
CooK-GuwMERz, supra note 155, at 223-30.
157. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 10.
158. For a lucid and in-depth look at this speech pattern and its effect on suspects'
rights, see id. at 275-82.
159. Id at 276.
160. L at 277-78.
161. Id at 280.
162.. Id at 281.
163. Id at 282.
164. Id at 263.
165. Id at 287.
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manuals to effectuate interrogations successful in gaining
confessions. 66
In jurisdictions applying the threshold-of-clarity approach, re-
quests for a lawyer voiced in this register were repeatedly found to
have failed to invoke the right to counsel. Statements found inade-
quate to invoke counsel almost invariably included the use of lexical
hedges, tag questions, and other modes of expression associated with
this register.' 67
By requiring "a clear assertion"' 68 to invoke counsel, Davis en-
sures that it will be more difficult for this sector of society to invoke
their rights during interrogation, even when they truly desire the
assistance of an attorney. 69 The Davis decision knowingly furthers
"the incorporation of unconscious androcentric assumptions into legal
doctrine"'170 to the detriment of nonwhite, nonmale sectors of society.
In addition, the plurality ignores the damaging psychological ef-
fects the threshold-of-clarity approach can have on these suspects.' 7
More important than just an abstract knowledge of one's rights is the
recognition that police are prepared to honor those rights. If a suspect
speaking in an indirect register voices a request in what she or he be-
lieves to be an imperative (but in fact is in ambiguous terms), and the
request is completely disregarded by the police, the suspect may be-
come convinced her or his rights and wishes are being systematically
ignored by the interrogators. A sense of desperation may ensue, in
which the suspect believes the only way to end the interrogation is to
166. FRED INBAU ET AL, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 24 (3d ed.
1986), quoted in Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2361 n.4 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
167. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 367 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Minn. 1985) ("[]f I'm going to
be charged with murder maybe I should talk to an attorney.") (emphasis added); People v.
Kendricks, 459 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (IIl. 1984) ("You know, I kind of think I know [sic] a
lawyer, don't I?" or "I think I might need a lawyer.") (emphasis added); Bunch v. Com-
monwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271,275 (Va. 1983) (Suspect said he "'felt like he might want to talk
to a lawyer."') (emphasis added); State v. Moorman, 744 P.2d 679, 685 (Ariz. 1987) ("I
wonder if I need an attorney.") (emphasis added); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 430
(Iowa 1982) ("Should I have my lawyer here?") (emphasis added).
168. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
169. For federal and state cases following Davis that exhibit this phenomenon, see sec-
tion IV, infra.
170. Ainsworth, supra note 10, at 261.
171. This Point is noted in Justice Souter's concurring opinion, vherein he states,
"When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored ... in contra-
vention of the 'rights' just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further objec-
tion as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation." Davis,
114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring); see also a at 2361 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).
confess to the crime. 172 It is precisely this sense of desperation which
most often leads to false confessions and compelled self-incrimination,
the very ills proscribed by the Fifth Amendment and against which the
Miranda Court strove to protect.
The plurality regards the Miranda warnings themselves as the
"primary protection" for these disadvantaged suspects.173 They con-
tend that once a suspect's rights have been read and waived, the sus-
pect has "indicated his [or her] willingness to deal with the police
unassisted."'174 Hence, once there has been a knowing and intelligent
waiver of Miranda rights, the burden for reinvoking them lies with the
suspect, requiring a clear and unequivocal request for counsel.' 75
First, the plurality assumes that Miranda warnings, read once by
the interrogators, are sufficient to ensure the suspect has fully under-
stood his or her rights.' 76 This is a deeply flawed and misleading as-
sumption. The pervasive presence of the Miranda warnings in the
mass media has overfamiliarized the public with the warnings, render-
ing them rote and ineffective. Many suspects, having heard the warn-
ings, still do not understand that they may remain silent without
incriminating themselves1 77 or have the right to an attorney not just at
court but also during the interrogation. 178 Given that a voluntary
172. See, e.g., Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). The court uncovered a detailed police task force plan to systemati-
cally ignore suspects' requests for counsel, aiming to induce hopelessness and extract con-
fessions which could later be used to impeach suspects and keep them off the witness stand.
let at 1225.
173. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
174. Id. It is relevant to note that police training manuals often recommend that of-
ficers downplay the Miranda warnings to decrease the possibility of suspects invoking their
rights. See, eg., JOHN M. MACDONALD & DAVID L. MICHAUD, INTERROGATION AND
CRIMINAL PROFILES FOR POLICE OFFICERS 17 (1987) ("Do not make a big issue of advising
the suspect of his rights. Do it quickly, do it briefly, and do not repeat it."); see also supra
note 49 and accompanying text; infra note 186.
175. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
176. After stating that the warnings are a suspect's primary protection, the plurality
cites Moran v. Burbine for the proposition that, "[f]ull comprehension of the rights to re-
main silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in
the interrogatidn process." 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986), quoted in Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
177. This belief is furthered by police statements which imply that cooperation would
be in the suspect's best interests, or conversely, that invocation of counsel is not in the
suspect's interest. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979). Of-
ficers in Thompson advised the suspect that "'if he waited and talked to an attorney, the
first thing the attorney would tell him is not to say anything and that if he had anything he
thought we should know, that he should go ahead and tell us."' Id at 770 n.2.
178. See also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1826 (1987). Professor Ogletree
states:
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waiver ordinarily requires an "intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege," '179 waivers obtained from these
suspects are of questionable validity.
Second, the police are asked to play conflicting roles during the
interrogation process. They are to assume the role of an advocate in
reading suspects their rights and ensuring they are understood. At the
same time, they are law enforcement officers interrogating the suspect
in an attempt to elicit incriminating statements. It is difficult, if not
impossible, for officers to adequately play both these roles. Given
that their objective is to obtain a confession, the police have little in-
terest in clearly explaining a suspect's rights, dispelling any miscon-
ceptions a suspect may have about these rights, or ensuring a knowing
and intelligent waiver.
Third, the distinction between a prewaiver invocation and a
postwaiver invocation is clearly inconsistent with Miranda. The Davis
plurality fails to take into account the Miranda Court's intention to
create rights that persist throughout the interrogation process and
provide a "continuous opportunity" for the suspect to exercise his or
her rights "at any stage," including after an initial waiver.' 8
Suspects might waive their rights initially to remain cooperative
with the police, but may want to reinvoke their rights later in the in-
terrogation as the questioning becomes more intense and they feel
themselves being incriminated. Placing a higher affirmative duty upon
a suspect when reinvoking is not only inconsistent with Miranda, but
is also in effect punishing the suspect for having cooperated with po-
lice questioning in its initial phase. Suspects have no incentive to co-
operate with the police and waive their rights initially, especially if
their own-waivers will make it more difficult for them to exercise their
rights to silence or counsel later in the interrogation. Furthermore,
My own experience as a public defender has been that many suspects make state-
ments during the process of police interrogation and are surprised to learn there-
after that they had a constitutional right to remain silent or to have an attorney
present during questioning. This pattern suggests that Miranda warnings as cur-
rently delivered by the police are not an effective means of informing suspects
both of the existence and extent of their privilege against self-incrimination and
of their right to consult with counsel before they make any statements.
Il at 1827-28.
179. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added).
180. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966). The Miranda Court emphasized
this point several times in the opinion. The Court asserted the Miranda safeguards existed
"to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfet-
tered throughout the interrogation process." Id. at 469 (emphasis added). Later, the Court
repeated: "Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to [the suspect] through-
out the interrogation." Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
this higher affirmative duty makes Miranda protections difficult to in-
voke precisely at the stage of the interrogation when a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights are most likely to be violated through compelled
self-incrimination.
C. Clear or Ambiguous?: Uncertainties Ccreated by Davis
The plurality rejects the per se invocation approach for fear of
losing the "clarity and ease of application" of the Edwards rule.'8 '
The concern for clarity and ease of application, however, remains un-
abated after the Davis decision since the opinion fails to adequately
distinguish clear requests for counsel from ambiguous ones. The opin-
ion merely states: "[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that
is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessa-
tion of questioning."'18 Alternatively, the opinion states, "[the sus-
pect] must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would un-
derstand the statement to be a request for an attorney. "183
Neither of these descriptions provides a solid basis for distin-
guishing between statements. Officers are still left with "difficult judg-
ment calls"'184 in determining whether a statement is clear or
ambiguous. Imagine a suspect says, "I believe I want an attorney." Is
this a clear'invocation of counsel? Is the statement, "I think I want an
attorney," more or less clear? What if a suspect asks, "May I have an
attorney?" Is this ambiguous because of its query form? 8 5 These are
the kinds of decisions that will be made by law enforcement officers
during interrogations. Inevitably, the determination of whether an in-
vocation is sufficiently clear will hinge on fine linguistic differences
181. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
182. Id. at 2355.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2356. Even courts are often nonplussed by these decisions. In deciding
whether the suspect had invoked his right to silence through the "ambiguous" words "I
can't say nothing," a district court following Davis characterized it as a "close call." United
States v. Sanchez, 866 F. Supp. 1542, 1559 (D. Kan. 1994). The court opted to believe the
officer's interpretation of the statement as a fear of reprisal from cohorts rather than an
invocation of the right to silence. Id.
185. In fact, this type of politeness can be and has been misconstrued as ambiguity
following the Davis decision. See, eg., Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir.
1994) (finding suspect's statement that "it would be nice" to have an attorney to be ambig-
uous and insufficient to invoke the right to counsel).
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and subjective understandings, reducing the suspect's Fifth Amend-
ment rights to mere semantics.
8 6
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the threshold-of-clarity ap-
proach is that it leaves the fox guarding the henhouse. The police
have little incentive to find that a statement was a clear invocation of
rights. Given even the barest hint of an ambiguity, the police are
prone to press on with the questioning rather than cease interrogation
and risk losing a confession. Therefore, conferring upon the interro-
gating officer the power to decide when a clear invocation has been
made is tantamount to eliminating a suspect's rights. Moreover, once
the determination is made, suspects realistically have little recourse.
Considering the frequent propensity of courts to defer to an officer's
decision, suspects will most often lose any "swearing matches" before
the court.187
The plurality's approach is unsound for two reasons: first, it
leaves this difficult determination to a police officer rather than the
suspects themselves, who are arguably most qualified to decide what
they meant by their statements; and second, it unrealistically requires
the utmost linguistic care from criminal suspects, rather than accord-
ing them the broad leeway they need to assert themselves in the fear-
ful and intimidating atmosphere of a custodial interrogation.' s
186. Note the double standard: suspects must assert their right to counsel clearly and
unequivocally, while the police are given wide latitude and may issue the Miranda warn-
ings in vague and inexact forms. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989). This is
particularly disturbing given the plurality's assertion in Davis that "the primary protection
afforded suspects ... is the Miranda warnings themselves." Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356; see
supra note 49 and accompanying text. But see Commonwealth v. Miranda, 641 N.E.2d 139,
140 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (citing Davis for the proposition that the primary protection
afforded suspects was the Miranda warnings themselves, and setting aside a verdict due to
inadequate recitation of the warnings by the officer involved).
187. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. 1980). While questioning a sus-
pect about several burglaries, officers began asking him about a stabbing death, at which
point the suspect said, "Wait a minute. Maybe I ought to have an attorney. You guys are
trying to pin a murder rap on me, give me 20 to 40 years." IdL at 538. The officers did not
cease interrogation or provide him with an attorney. None of the interrogating officers
believed this statement to be a request for counsel and the Illinois Supreme Court accepted
their judgment, stating, "the officers must be allowed to exercise their judgment in deter-
mining whether a suspect has requested counsel." Id. at 540; see also State v. Kekona, 886
P.2d 740 (Haw. 1994). In Kekona, the suspect claimed he had said, "I no like talk no more
[sic]" prior to his confession, thus invoking his right to silence. Id. at 744. The officers
denied he had made such a statement. Id The interrogation was not tape recorded despite
the presence of such equipment in the station. Id. at 747. The Supreme Court of Hawaii
sided with the officers despite their failure to record the interrogation. Id. at 743. Further-
more, they overlooked the fact that the suspect had a learning disability and the equivalent
of a fourth grade education. Id.
188. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
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D. Public Policy Arguments Underlying Davis
The decision in Davis represents a fork in the road in many ways.
In determining the level of clarity with which a suspect must voice his
or her request for counsel, the Court essentially decided the breadth
with which Miranda and Edwards. would apply, and which suspects
would benefit from their protection. The Court also chose between
the competing interests of the suspect's right to have counsel present
during interrogation and the desire for police efficiency.
Underlying the decision in Davis is the implicit suggestion that
the involvement of an attorney in the interrogation process may "un-
duly hamper[ ] the gathering of information." 189 This notion is dis-
turbing and clearly at odds with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the role of lawyers in the criminal justice system.
190
In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court stated, "No system worth pre-
serving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult
with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, [his constitu-
tional] rights."191 To seek to remove the presence of counsel for fear
it might hamper police investigation is to ignore the constitutional
boundaries within which the police are required to conduct their in-
vestigation. While concern for law enforcement effectiveness is legiti-
mate, and lost confessions do exact a price from society, the price is
one which the Miranda Court decreed should be paid to ensure cer-
tain constitutional rights.
1 92
The Miranda Court felt strongly about the role of counsel during
the interrogation process, and concluded lawyers are present to pro-
tect the rights of their clients, not to hamper police investigation. 9 3
The Court stated that "[i]n doing so an attorney is merely exercising
the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not cause
for considering the attorney a menace to law enforcement.'
94
189. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
190. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (disallowing confession obtained
in police station house inadmissible due to deprivation of the right to counsel). But see
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (suspect's waiver of rights effective even though
police declined to tell him of counsel retained for him and prevented counsel from seeing
her client); supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. For analysis of the Court's decision
in Moran, see Laura Antonelli, Note, Moran v. Burbine: The Decline of Defense Counsel's
"Vital" Role in the Criminal Justice System, 36 CAT. U. L. Rnv. 253 (1986).
191. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490.
192. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
193. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-82. The Court stated that "[iun fulfilling this responsibil-
ity the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice under our Consti-
tution." Id. at 481.
194. Id. at 480.
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The Davis Court preferred "the other side of the Miranda equa-
tion: the need for effective law enforcement."1 95 The furthering of po-
lice efficiency, however, should not necessitate the denial of suspects'
rights or the exclusion of attorneys from the interrogation process. A
reluctance to provide lawyers during the interrogation process does
not further the desire for police efficiency as much as it suggests dis-
satisfaction with the Fifth Amendment itself.
Much more is at stake than simply the sanctity of the right to
counsel during interrogation. At the core of Davis is a willingness to
accept possibly involuntary confessions and compelled self-incrimina-
tion. In its quest to further police efficiency, the Court has overlooked
the very real prospect of convictions, with the attendant loss of liberty
or even life, based upon unreliable confessions.
IV. The Scope and Effect of the Davis Decision
While a seemingly narrow decision, the impact of Davis is being
felt in a much wider context. In federal and state courts, Davis is be-
ing cited to undercut suspects' Miranda rights during the interrogation
process, both with respect to the right to counsel and the right to
silence.
A. Federal Courts and Davis
1. Davis and the Right to Counsel
The exacting standard of invocation set forth by Davis is having a
clear impact on the outcome of federal cases dealing with the right to
counsel during interrogation. The Sixth Circuit concluded in Ledbet-
ter v. Edwards that the suspect's statement "it would be nice" to have
an attorney was more ambiguous than that in Davis and therefore,
insufficient to invoke counsel. 9 6 Under Davis, the suspect's polite-
ness was interpreted as ambiguity, thereby depriving him of his right
to counsel. The Ledbetter court ignored that the three hour interroga-
tion took place after midnight and involved trickery and misrepresen-
tations, such as false witness and fingerprint identifications. 97
195. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
196. 35 F.3d 1062, 1069-70 (6th Cir. 1994).
197. ld. at 1065. The interrogation began at 12:25 a.m. and continued for three hours.
Id. During the interrogation, the suspect was shown two enlarged photographs and a chart
supposedly indicating that a fingerprint expert had made a "14 point comparison" between
a latent print from the suspect's van and his fingerprint. Id He was falsely told the victim
and two witnesses had identified him from a photographic array. Id. He was furthered
advised the victim was waiting outside the interview room to identify him. Id. A female
police officer was then positioned in front of a two-way mirror so her silhouette could be
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In Lord v. Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit applied Davis and
found the suspect had not clearly invoked counsel, despite the suspect
having asked about counsel on two separate occasions, each time re-
ceiving uninformative responses from the police.198 On the first 6cca-
sion, the suspect stated, "I can't afford a lawyer but is there anyway
[sic] I can get one?"'199 Instead of explaining to the suspect that he
could have an attorney right away free of charge, the officer simply
replied, "Yeah," and nodded his head.2"0 The next day, as an officer
went to retrieve a tape recorder to record further statements, the sus-
pect asked if he would be able to obtain a lawyer when he went to
court.20 1 The officers replied that the court had a procedure for ap-
pointing lawyers. 202 Throughout this two-day custodial interrogation,
it is obvious the suspect did not understand that he could have counsel
at any time without charge. Nor did the officers make any attempt to
explain this to him. The Seventh Circuit held the suspect's statements
"appeared to be in the nature of queries regarding future access to
counsel for a court hearing rather than a request for counsel at that
time," and thus insufficient to invoke counsel.203 The court failed to
question whether the suspect even understood the nature of his rights
and whether the police had a duty to clearly explain them.
Suspects such as these are in a no-win situation after Davis. De-
spite having been read their Miranda warnings, they evidently lack
understanding of their exact rights. Yet under Davis, their questions
regarding counsel, being classified as ambiguous invocations, can go
unanswered or be completely ignored by the police. Hence, they can
neither gain the information they need through their questions, nor
can they make a clear invocation of their rights.
Similarly, in a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Scurlock, the
suspect stated that she needed a lawyer prior to the taping of her con-
fession.20 4 In response, the officer handed her the district attorney's
seen by the suspect. Id Officers left the room and then returned to tell the suspect that
the victim had positively identified him. Id. These tactics are sanctioned by the Court, as
long as they do not deprive the suspect of knowledge of his rights and the consequences of
waiving them. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 417 (1986); see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding officer's lie to the suspect that his partner had confessed did
not make the suspect's statements inadmissible).
198. 29 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir. 1994).





204. 52 F.3d 531, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1995).
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business card and suggested that once she had employed a lawyer, the
lawyer should contact the district attorney listed on the card.2"5 Once
again, the court overlooked this wholly inadequate response to a re-
quest for counsel, finding that the suspect's queries could be inter-
preted as a "recognition by the defendant of her need for an attorney
in the future if the case reached the indictment stage.
'"206
2. Davis and the Right to Silence
Since many courts feel the same standard should apply to both
the right to silence and the right to counsel, they are extrapolating
from Davis and narrowing the standard for invocations of the right to
silence as well. The Eleventh Circuit in Coleman v. Singletary stated:
Because [the need for a bright-line rule] applies with equal force
to the invocation of the right to remain silent, and because we
have previously held that the same rule should apply in both
contexts, we hold that the Davis rule applies to invocations of
the right to remain silent.20 7
In Coleman, the Eleventh Circuit set aside its previous clarifica-
tion standard and cited Davis to support the proposition that a juve-
nile suspect's statement during interrogation was insufficiently clear to
invoke his right to silence.208 The following exchange took place after
a public defender had contacted the interrogating officers and asked
them to cease questioning the youth:
[Officer 1]: And what you're saying, or what you're about to say
you're going to do of your own free will; is that correct?
Suspect]: Yes. Unless, what about that one guy, though?
Officer 1]: What guy?
Suspect]: The guy-
Officer 2]: Public defender.
Suspect]: Yeah.
Officer 1]: Okay.
Officer 2]: I explained to him what the public defender was-
Officer 11: Okay. Tony, do you feel that you want to have a
public defender?
[Suspect]: I don't know. But if he said to stop it I don't want to
do what he said not to do.
[Officer 1]: All right. Well, do you have any objections to talk-
ing to us? ... If you want to talk to us we'll listen....
[Suspect]: I guess if that guy thinks it's all right, I don't care.209
205. Id at 536.
206. Id. at 537.
207. 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994).
208. Id. at 1423-24.
209. I& at 1422-23.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Davis approach, under which
they found the suspect had not clearly invoked his right to silence
through the statement, "I don't know. But if he said to stop it, I don't
want to do what he said not to do."210 The dissent argued that in
common usage the word "but" usually "qualifies and limits preceding
language."21' Hence, the juvenile's statement was arguably intended
to express his desire to remain silent until he knew what his lawyer
would advise him to do.2 12 The dissent also argued that the suspect, a
fifteen-year-old boy, "cannot be expected to speak with the clarity of
an average adult.
213
Likewise, a district court in Kansas found that a suspect's state-
ment, "I can't say nothing," was ambiguous, thus failing to invoke his
right to silence.2 14 Despite indications that the suspect had not under-
stood the Miranda warnings, due to his limited English language skills,
the court accepted as "plausible" the officer's interpretation of the
statement as a fear of reprisals from cohorts rather than an invocation
of his right to silence.215 These cases demonstrate that Davis is having
a much broader impact than expected, infringing on suspects' right to
silence as well.
B. State Courts and Davis
Despite the option to provide greater protections under their re-
spective state constitutions, many state courts have quickly adopted
the Davis threshhold-of-clarity standard. The Arizona Supreme
Court in State v. Eastlack found the suspect's statement, "I think I
better talk to a lawyer first," to be ambiguous and insufficient to in-
yoke counsel under the Davis standard.21 6 The suspect's use of the
hedge "I think" effectively cost him his right to counsel. The court
cited Davis and said, "The statement itself was ambiguous, using the
210. Id at 1423-24.
211. Id at 1428 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
212. Id
213. Id at 1429 n.3.
214. United States v. Sanchez, 866 F. Supp. 1542, 1559 (D. Kan. 1994).
215. Id Non-English speaking suspects are particularly vulnerable to misinterpretation
when making a request. See, e.g., United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750-51 (9th
Cir. 1992) (noting that Spanish-speaking interpreter, through whom the request for counsel
was made, admitted the request could have been misclassified as ambiguous when in fact it
was unambiguous).
216. 883 P.2d 999, 1006-07 (Ariz. 1994).
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equivocal language 'I think' rather than the language of a clear
request.
217
Just as in federal courts, the invocations put in the form of a ques-
tion were most often found to be ambiguous by state courts. In Hig-
gins v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas cited Davis in finding a
suspect's query, "Do you think I need a lawyer?" to be ambiguous and
inadequate to invoke counsel.218 In People v. Crittenden, the Supreme
Court of California also used the Davis standard, and found the sus-
pect had not invoked his right to counsel through the question, "Did
you say I could have a lawyer? '219 In State v. Bailey, the Supreme
Court of Kansas followed Davis and held that the suspect's question
as to whether "he should ask for an attorney at that time" was ambig-
uous and did not require clarification.2 0
Similarly, in State v. Panetti, a Texas appellate court cited Davis
and found the suspect's question, "Should I be answering these ques-
tions without my lawyer, or does it matter, or I mean I-I give up,
anyway," to be ambiguous and insufficient to invoke counsel.221 In
doing so, the court reversed its earlier holding in the same case, in
which the officer had failed to sufficiently narrow his response to clari-
fying the request.a2 Following Davis, the court stated, "[W]e see no
reason to ...create greater rights on behalf of criminal suspects
against the state than the United States Constitution requires." 23 As
illustrated by these cases, the Davis standard does not require the po-
lice to even acknowledge the suspect's question, much less provide an
217. Id at 1007. A concurring justice correctly pointed out that even in the Davis case
itself, the statement, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else," qualified as an
unequivocal invocation of counsel and successfully halted the interrogation. Id at 1021
(Kleinschmidt, J., concurring). The justice felt the phrase "I think" in this context was
"not, as used by most people, all that ambiguous." Id (Kleinschmidt, J., concurring).
218. 879 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1994). The suspect asked this before the interrogation
and received the response, "You will have to have one." Id. at 425. Again, the court
ignored this wholly uninformative and arguably misleading reply by the officer.
219. 885 P.2d 887, 909,912-13 (Cal. 1994). California courts may not have the option of
providing greater protection under the California Constitution. Pursuant to article I, sec-
tion 28(d) of the California Constitution, added as a result of Proposition 8 in 1981, the
California Supreme Court is constricted to the use of federal standards in reviewing de-
fendants' claims. See id. at 912. On issues already decided by the United States Supreme
Court under the Constitution, Proposition 8 eliminated the "independent state grounds"
standard for reviewing claims. Hence, the California Supreme Court is foreclosed from
deciding the Davis issue independently. See In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752-53 (Cal.
1988).
220. 889 P.2d 738, 745-47 (Kan. 1995) (emphasis omitted).
221. 891 S.W.2d 281, 282, 284 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
222. Id at 282.
223. Id. at 284.
adequate answer, and allows them to continue their interrogation
unhindered.
Similar to federal courts, state courts are also applying the Davis
standard to the right to silence. The Supreme Court of West Virginia
in State v. Farley declined to officially adopt the Davis approach 224 but
stated, "We believe that under Davis insubstantial and trivial doubt,
reasonably caused by the defendant's ambiguous statements as to
whether he wants the interrogation to end, should be resolved in favor
of the police." 225 Subsequently, the court found the suspect had failed
to invoke his right to silence during interrogation. 226
The pattern of these decisions confirms the notion that powerless
sectors of society are paying the heaviest price. Under Davis, invoca-
tions found to be ambiguous, and thus ineffective, predictably in-
volved the attributes and speech patterns of the powerless-ignorance
of their rights, unassertiveness, over-politeness, timidity, hesitation,
distrust and, most often, imperatives expressed in query form. These
cases poignantly illustrate that an inability to conform to the Court's
exacting linguistic standard could cost suspects their rights to silence
and counsel during custodial interrogation.
V. Proposal
While federal courts are bound by Davis, state courts remain free
to treat the decision as a foundation and provide greater protections
under their respective state constitutions. 227 This Comment argues
that the threshold-of-clarity and clarification standards do not ade-
quately protect suspects' rights and proposes that states adopt the per
se invocation standard as the only approach which is in line with prior
jurisprudence and the spirit of the Fifth Amendment itself.
A. Threshold-of-Clarity and Clarification Approaches Are Inadequate
to Protect Suspects' Rights
The threshold-of-clarity approach is inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent and the advice of a majority of courts and law en-
224. 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 n.12 (W. Va. 1994).
225. Id at 59.
226. IdL
227. See, e.g., State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504 (Haw. 1994). The court stated, "[W]e are free
to give broader protection under the Hawai'i [sic] Constitution than that given by the fed-
eral constitution .... [W]e choose to afford our citizens broader protection under... the
Hawai'i [sic] Constitution than that recognized by the Davis majority." Id at 523; see also
supra note 24. But see supra note 219 (regarding California courts, Proposition 8, and the
California Constitution).
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forcement agencies. This approach will undercut a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights to silence and counsel, and unfairly place a heavier
burden upon the suspect in an already intimidating situation.
Similarly, the clarification approach presents new difficulties due
to the potential for abuse inherent in the clarifying process.218 Clarify-
ing questions, ostensibly used to determine the wishes of the suspect,
may instead be used to badger the suspect into rescinding what may
have been a desire to have counsel. For example, in Bane v. State, the
following conversation took place while the interrogator was "clarify-
ing" the suspect's statement:
[Officer]: [I]t's my understanding you don't want to sign the
rights form now is that right?[Suspect]: Not 'til you know?
Officer]: O.K.
Suspect]: When I talk to my lawyer I'll.
Officer]: O.K. But you don't want a lawyer at this time, is thatcorrect?
[Suspect]: I will get a lawyer.
Officer]: O.K. But you don't want one now is what I'm saying.
O.K.?
[Suspect]: I'd like to have one but you know I [sic] it would be
hard to get hold of one right now.
[Officer]: Well what I am asking you Clayton is do you wish to
give me a statement at this time without having a lawyer
p resent?
Suspect]: Well I can I can [sic] tell you what I did.
Officer]: O.K. that's what, that's what [sic] I'm asking. 9
This exchange demonstrates how an officer, while ostensibly de-
termining the suspect's wishes, is in fact badgering the suspect and
discouraging him from invoking his right to counsel. Despite having
been read his Miranda rights, the suspect clearly does not understand
that a lawyer can be appointed, and the officer makes no attempt to
explain the ease with which an attorney may be procured for him at
no charge. The Indiana Supreme Court held the suspect had not in-
voked his right to counsel through this exchange.3 °
Hence, officers can easily discourage the invocation of counsel
while seemingly attempting to ascertain the suspect's wishes, thereby
transforming a beneficial process into a detrimental one. At that
point, the suspect's remedies are few since the officers have followed
the correct procedure by "clarifying" the suspect's statement.
228. This problem is acknowledged in Justice Souter's concurring opinion. Davis v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2363 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
229. 587 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ind. 1992).
230. Id
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A further difficulty with the clarification approach is that officers
may use the clarifying process to circumvent Edwards. Rather than
ending the interrogation upon a clearly asserted invocation of counsel,
officers may proceed to "clarify" the statement and, in the process,
often persuade the suspect to forego counsel and speak with the police
instead.
This phenomenon is poignantly illustrated by a Fifth Circuit case,
Nash v. Estelle, 3' often cited with approval by courts which have
adopted the clarification standard.232 In Nash, the suspect clearly and
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel:
[Suspect]: If I want a lawyer present, I just put down I want him
present?
[Officer]: Please just tell us about it. Any time we are talking
and you decide that you need someone else here, you just tell
me about it and we will get somebody up here.
[Suspect]: Well, I don't have the money to hire one, but I would
like, you know, to have one appointed.
[Officer]: You want one to be appointed for you?
[Suspect]: Yes, sir.33
Upon this invocation, the Edwards protection should have been trig-
gered and all questioning should have ceased. Nevertheless, the of-
ficer continued to question him, albeit in a "clarifying" manner, after
which the suspect signed a waiver form.234 The court found the sus-
pect's invocation of counsel was merely equivocal, properly clarified
by the officer.235 Thus the clarification approach provides an avenue
through which officers, backed by the courts, are able to bypass even
the bright-line rule of Edwards.
One commentator has suggested using the clarification standard
supplemented by heightened judicial scrutiny of police behavior. 2 6 It
231. 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
232. Se4 e.g., Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fouche,
833 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1987).
233. Nash, 597 F.2d at 516-17.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 517.
236. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. A more far-reaching alternative is to
have the right to counsel "attach" at the custodial interrogation stage, just as it does at the
initiation of adversary criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment. United States v.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984). Under this "per se bar" approach, any statements ob-
tained without having first afforded the suspect a chance to consult with counsel would be
deemed inadmissible. See generally Ogletree, supra note 178. This concept was originally
advocated by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in their amicus brief in Mi-
randa. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, in LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES: CONSTrTU-
TIoNAL LAW 701, 727 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). However, the
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is argued that this approach can succeed in safeguarding suspects'
rights if courts use their judicial oversight to crack down on officers
abusing the clarification process.237 Unfortunately, this type of over-
sight will once again burden the courts and strain already depleted
judicial resources. Furthermore, it will lead to "swearing matches"
between suspects and the police which suspects rarely win.238 Realis-
tically, without an effective system of oversight and discipline, this ap-
proach remains unprotective of suspects' Miranda rights.
B. The Per Se Invocation Standard
Several basic factors must be kept in mind when deciding which
invocation standard to adopt. First, coerciveness and a heightened po-
tential for abuse are inherent in the custodial interrogation process2 3 9
Second, due to a severe overload of the judicial system, there is a
great need for the conservation of judicial resources. Third, in the
interests of practical application, a clear standard or bright-line rule is
preferable.240 Finally, any standard adopted must treat all persons
equally and ensure that all suspects have a fair opportunity to access
their Fifth Amendment rights.
The per se invocation standard pays heed to all of these concerns.
It recognizes the coercion inherent in the custodial interrogation pro-
cess. Accordingly, it grants the suspect the benefit of the doubt, so
that any mention of counsel will trigger the suspect's constitutional
rights. It furthers the interests of judicial economy, as it is a bright-
line rule requiring virtually no guesswork by police officers or
courts.241 Most importantly, this standard ensures all citizens equal
access to their Fifth Amendment rights, regardless of their particular
attributes or speech patterns. Also, this approach is consistent with
Court in Davis reiterated its rejection of the suggestion "that each police station must have
a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners." Davis v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
237. See supra note 23.
238. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
239. This served as the basis for the Miranda decision. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
240. Chief Justice Rehnquist reminded counsel during oral argument: "This has got to
be administered by thousands of trial courts." Arguments Before the Court, supra note 20,
at 3682.
241. In the words of Justice Levinson of the Hawaiian Supreme Court, decisions which
overlook misapplication of required procedure by the police "virtually invite[ ] a deluge of
time-consuming and avoidable appeals in the future," thereby increasing the costs of the
criminal justice system. State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 747 (Haw. 1994) (Levinson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
precedent and supported by the "in any manner and at any stage"'242
language of Miranda.
Nor would the per se invocation standard unduly infringe upon
law enforcement efficiency. In practice, Miranda has not had a great
impact upon the ability of the police to obtain confessions.243 In fact,
law enforcement agencies prefer the retention of Miranda-type rules
because they are simple to apply and help avoid the suppression of
evidence at trial.2' Moreover, the effectiveness of Miranda has been
severely curtailed by the Court's post-Miranda case law, which greatly
narrowed its application. 245 Any effect the per se invocation standard
might have on law enforcement is limited to what Miranda itself has
been shown to have on law enforcement-an effect which the Mi-
randa Court decreed should be borne by society in exchange for the
protection of a constitutional right.
Justice Souter criticizes the per se invocation approach as poten-
tially thwarting a suspect's wish to talk to the police.246 The Justice's
reasoning is flawed and disingenuous, as it is difficult to conceive of
242. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
243. See Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519 (1967) (finding Miranda had no significant impact on the New Haven,
Connecticut criminal justice system); John Griffiths & Richard E. Ayres, A Postscript to the
Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE LJ. 300 (1967) (Miranda warn-
ings did not prevent self-incrimination in study conducted on Yale students, faculty, and
staff); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statisti-
cal Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 23 (1967) (Miranda had no significant effect on conviction
rates in Pittsburgh); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Na-
tion's Capitak The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. RFv. 1347, 1394-95 (1968)
(Miranda had no observable effect on suspect, attorney, or police behavior in Washington,
D.C.); Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Mi-
randa, 47 DENY. L.J. 1 (1970) (implementation of Miranda warnings in the FBI, Colorado
Springs, and Denver police departments are ineffective); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive In-
terrogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police
Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 325 (1973) (interrogations conducted in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area were successful in 69% of pre-Miranda cases and 67%
of post-Miranda cases); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan,
39 VAND. L. REv. 1, 17 (1986) (Miranda has relatively little effect on law enforcement and
the ability to obtain confessions); Ogletree, supra note 178, at 1827; Mark Berger, Compro-
mise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of the
Interrogation Protections, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1007, 1009 (1988). But see Gerald M.
Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1424 (1985) (questioning validity of
empirical studies and conclusion that Miranda has had little effect on law enforcement);
Stephen J. Markman, The.Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to
"Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. Crm L. REv. 938, 945-48 (1987) (Miranda has had nega-
tive effects on law enforcement).
244. Berger, supra note 243, at 1010.
245. See supra section I.B.
246. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2364 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
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(and he does not detail) a situation in which a suspect would benefit
from uncounseled interrogation. Moreover, any statement by a sus-
pect involving counsel should automatically invoke that right. It is
doubtful whether a suspect in a high pressure situation such as a cus-
todial interrogation will ever mention a lawyer without a genuine and
coexisting desire to consult with counsel.
The per se invocation standard is not absurd, radical, or impru-
dent, but rather in keeping with the Miranda language requiring that
questioning should cease if the suspect indicated "in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wish[ed] to consult with an attor-
ney."247 Should the Court feel this approach is unwise, it should have
the intellectual honesty and integrity to actually overrule Miranda,
rather than simply maneuver its way around the landmark decision
each time this type of Fifth Amendment question is presented.248
Perhaps the key distinction between advocates of the per se invo-
cation approach and advocates of more restrictive approaches is their
attitude towards law enforcement. Essentially, the choice hinges upon
one's level of trust and confidence in the good faith of officers. While
it is by no means the case that all officers are untrustworthy, it is also
naive to assume that no officer will ever abuse the procedures. 249 Mi-
randa was premised on the belief that police interrogations are inher-
ently coercive and intimidating,150 and the Court set up procedural
safeguards to protect against police overreaching. 1
247. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added).
248. Professor Kamisar has suggested that "Miranda was the first chapter in a book that
was never written." BAXER, supra note 100, at 185.
249. Recent events such as the role of Mark Fuhrman in the OJ. Simpson trial and the
police corruption probe in Philadelphia lend support to a healthy cynicism about the role
of police officers in the criminal justice system. Colbert I. King, Too Many Fuhrmans,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1995, at A19; Brian McGrory, Fear, Loathing on Streets: Probe of
Police Roils Philadelphia, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1995, at 1; Bill Miller, Officers' Image
Tarnished: Simpson Verdict Highlights Mistrust of Police, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,1995, at Col;
Kevin Sack, Racism of Rogue Officer Casts Suspicion on Police Nationwide, N.Y. TiMws,
Sept. 4, 1995 § 1, at 1.
Mark Fuhrman was quoted as saying, "[My partner] is so hung up on the rules and
stuff. I get pissed sometimes and go, 'You just don't even [expletive] understand. This job
is not rules. This is a feeling. [Expletive] the rules; we'll make them up later."' Elizabeth
Gleick, The Crooked Blue Line, TimE, Sept. 11, 1995, at 38. The police probe in Philadel-
phia has already resulted in the overturning of 66 criminal convictions, with 1500 other
convictions in serious jeopardy. The FBI has also seized the records of almost 100,000
other arrests over a decade-long period. Stephane Bentura, Police Racism, Corruption
Shaking U.S. Justice System, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires Files.
250. Id. at 455.
251. Id- at 446-48.
The Davis Court has unequivocally renounced this premise. The
unwavering belief in the good faith of officers leaves suspects unpro-
tected against those officers who stray from the Court's ideal and
abuse their power during custodial interrogations. As of this decision,
police are free to give vague and inexact readings of the Miranda
warnings, 2 fail to give the Miranda warnings entirely and still use the
confession to impeach the suspect at trial,2 53 deceive the suspect
through trickery or misrepresentations into confessing,254 ignore the
suspect's questions regarding counsel,255 and ultimately decide for sus-
pects whether they have invoked their right to silence or counsel
through their statements.-"6 The Court has nearly overturned the
scales in favor of the "other side of the Miranda equation,"' 7 leaving
suspects with few rights and almost no remedy.
The per se invocation standard presents a bright-line rule that is
easy to apply and does not sacrifice suspects' rights for police effi-
ciency. Given the inherently compelling atmosphere of a custodial in-
terrogation, suspects should be afforded the benefit of the doubt in
invoking their Fifth Amendment rights and obtaining the assistance of
counsel. If courts are to be true to the spirit of the Fifth Amendment,
this standard is the most just and egalitarian one to adopt.
VI. Conclusion
In Davis, the Court ignores the fundamental premise set forth in
Miranda that custodial interrogations are inherently coercive and
compelling. By failing to require, at the very least, clarification of a
suspect's ambiguous statement, this decision further undercuts the
constitutional rights of suspects in custody. 5 8
Awareness of one's rights prior to a waiver is the cornerstone of
the determination whether a confession was voluntarily or involunta-
252. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-03 (1989).
253. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971).
254. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-38
(1969); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
255. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994) (police need not clarify an
ambiguous invocation of counsel); see also Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir.
1994); People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 913 (Cal. 1994); Higgins v. State, 879 S.W.2d 424,
428 (Ark. 1994); State v. Bailey, 889 P.2d 738, 747 (Kan. 1995).
256. E.g., Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
257. Id. at 2356.
258. Ironically, the United States Attorney General argued for the adoption of the clar-
ification standard in Davis. See U at 2359 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring). The Court went
above and beyond this request in adopting the threshold-of-clarity standard.
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rily given.25 9 Cases following Davis clearly illustrate that many sus-
pects who waive their rights have not fully understood the nature of
their rights and the Miranda warnings alone are inadequate as notifi-
cation.26 ° This refutes the Davis plurality's assertion that the warnings
themselves should constitute the "primary protection afforded sus-
pects subject to custodial interrogation.1261 In fact, the Miranda
Court warned against this, stating, "A once-stated warning, delivered
by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to
that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights."
262
Hence, the sole protection offered by the plurality to disadvantaged
suspects fails to be truly protective.
The Fifth Amendment does not distinguish between those who
can speak assertively and those who cannot, and neither should the
Court. Nor should suspects who know and understand their rights
gain an advantage over those who, for various reasons, might not un-
derstand their rights. These concerns were fundamental to the Mi-
randa decision and remain fundamental today.
The cases263 as they are unfolding show that Justice Souter's ex-
pectations are not coming to fruition and suspects are being required
to "speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don"26 to invoke their
rights. Justice Souter's language is already being quoted in dissents,
265
indicating that courts are not "apply[ing the Davis] ruling sensibly.
'266
Regardless of the Court's intention, the Davis standard is unleashing a
devastating blow to the Fifth Amendment rights of suspects in
custody.
259. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding a waiver is an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege") (emphasis added).
260. See supra section IV.
261. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
262. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966); see also supra note 125 and accom-
panying text.
263. See supra section IV.
264. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring).
265. See, e.g., Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1429 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994) (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
266. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring).
